Florida International University

FIU Digital Commons
Telecommunications and Information Technology
Institute

College of Engineering and Computing

2008

Attack DistributionModeling and Its Applications
in Sensor Network Security
Xiangqian Chen
Telecommunications and Information Technology Institute, Florida International University, xchen002@fiu.edu

Kia Makki
Telecommunications and Information Technology Institute, Florida International University

Kang Yen
Telecommunications and Information Technology Institute, Florida International University, yenk@fiu.edu

Niki Pissinou
Telecommunications and Information Technology Institute, Florida International University, pissinou@fiu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/it2_fac
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Engineering Commons
Recommended Citation
X. Chen, K. Makki, K. Yen, and N. Pissinou, Attack Distribution Modeling and Its Applications in Sensor Network Security, Journal on
Wireless Communications and Networking, 10.1155/2008/754252, 2008.

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Engineering and Computing at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Telecommunications and Information Technology Institute by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

Hindawi Publishing Corporation
EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
Volume 2008, Article ID 754252, 11 pages
doi:10.1155/2008/754252

Research Article
Attack Distribution Modeling and Its Applications in
Sensor Network Security
Xiangqian Chen, Kia Makki, Kang Yen, and Niki Pissinou
Telecommunications and Information Technology Institute (IT2), Florida International University, Miami, FL 33174, USA
Correspondence should be addressed to Xiangqian Chen, xchen002@fiu.edu
Received 31 August 2007; Accepted 17 December 2007
Recommended by Farid Ahmed
Defending against attack is the key successful factor for sensor network security. There are many approaches that can be used to
detect and defend against attacks, yet few are focused on modeling attack distribution. Knowing the distribution models of attacks
can help system estimate the attack probability and thus defend against them eﬀectively and eﬃciently. In this paper, we use probability theory to develop a basic uniform model, a basic gradient model, an intelligent uniform model and an intelligent gradient
model of attack distribution in order to adapt to diﬀerent application environments. These models allow systems to estimate the
attack probability of each node under a given position and time. Applying these models in system security designs can improve
system security performance and decrease the overheads in nearly every security area. Based on these models, we describe a novel
probability secure routing algorithm that is eﬀective to defend against attacks whether they are detected or not. Besides this application, we also introduce some other applications, such as secure routing that can save systems available energy and resources
while still providing enough security, detecting attack, and key management.
Copyright © 2008 Xiangqian Chen et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Recent advances in electronic and computer technologies
lead to widespread deployment of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) on the horizon. Diﬀerent WSNs may consist of different types of sensors, such as seismic, low sampling rate,
magnetic, thermal, visual, infrared, acoustic, and radar sensors, which can monitor temperature, humidity, vehicular
movement, lightning condition, pressure, soil makeup, noise
levels, and so on [1]. These various classes of sensors lead
to WSNs wide-range applications, including military sensing
and tracking, environment monitoring, patient monitoring
and tracking, and smart environments [2].
Many sensor networks have mission-critical tasks, such
as above military applications. Thus, the security issues in
WSNs are kept in the foreground among research areas.
Compared with other wireless networks, such as ad hoc wireless LAN and cellular networks, security in WSNs is more
complicated due to the constrained capabilities of sensor
node hardware and the properties of the deployment environment .

Security issues mainly come from attacks. If no attack occurred, there is no need for security. Thus, detecting and defending against attacks are important tasks of security mechanisms. It is obvious that knowing the probabilities of attacks can help systems monitor, identify, and defend against
them eﬃciently and eﬀectively. Although there are some approaches that can be adapted to detect and defend against
attacks, few of them have been done to provide a method
to estimate the probability of being attacked for each node.
Most current approaches assume the same probability of attack occurring everywhere as a matter of course, and use this
embedded assumption without a clear declaration in their
systems. In fact, their hypothesis is diﬀerent from some special applications in which attacks may occur with diﬀerent
probabilities. For example, how can one think that the attack
close to an enemy-controlled area transpires with the same
probability as in a controlled area?
In this paper, we present several attack distribution models in order to estimate attack probability, and then provide several applications based on these models. Our current modeling works are based on static WSNs, that is, sensor
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nodes will not change their positions after deployment. Besides this assumption, we suppose that there exists attack detecting system in our intelligent models. Our current attack
distribution models can be adapted to those types of attacks
that the attack probability for a node is correlated with the attack events of its neighbors and its position. In WSNs, many
types of attacks occur with the above neighbor eﬀect and position eﬀect. Based on our survey, this is the first time that attack distribution models have been proposed to estimate the
attack probability of a node under a given position and time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents related work. Section 3 describes the details of attack distribution models. Section 4 shows some applications
of these models. Finally, we conclude and lay out some future
work in Section 5.
2.

RELATED WORK

In this section, we give a concise introduction of related work
as two categories: attack detection and prevention, and node
positioning.
2.1. Attack detection and prevention
Due to the wireless nature and special deployment environments of WSNs [3], a great variety of attacks are possible.
To express clearly, we give a short summation of attacks and
defense suggestions based on the point of view of open system interconnect (OSI) model. Generally, the typical layered
networking model of sensor networks includes the physical
layer, the data link layer, the network layer, the transport
layer, the middleware layer, and the application layer. Each
layer is susceptible to diﬀerent attacks. Even some attacks
can crosscut multiple layers or exploit interactions between
them. In this paper, we mainly discuss attacks and defenses
on the transport layer and below layers.
Physical layer
Jamming and tampering are the major types of physical attacks [4]. The standard defense against jamming involves
various forms of spread spectrum, frequency hopping, lowduty cycle, rerouting traﬃc, adopting prioritized transmission scheme, and so on. Tampering is another type of physical attack in sensor network. An attacker can also tamper
with nodes physically, interrogate and compromise them.
Tamper protection falls into two categories: passive (e.g., hiding) and active (e.g., tamper-proofing circuit).
Data link layer
Collision, exhaustion, and unfairness are the major attacks in
this layer [4]. The normal defending methods to these three
attacks, respectively, are error-correcting code, rate limitation, and small frames, although these mechanisms have limitations.

Network layer
There are many types of attacks in this layer. Karlof and
Wagner summarize the attacks of network layer as follows:
spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information; selective forwarding; sinkhole attacks; sybil attacks; wormholes;
HELLO flood attacks; acknowledgement spoofing [5]. Authentication, identification, multipath, neighbor node monitor, location, distance verification, and so on are the normal
methods to prevent routing attacks.
Transport layer
Flooding and desynchronization are the normal attacks in
this layer [4]. Solving client puzzles can partly ease flooding. One counter to desynchronization is to authenticate all
packets exchanged, including all control fields in the transport protocol header.
As a whole, attack detecting methods can be classified
as centralized approaches and neighbors’ cooperative approaches. Centralized approaches use the base station to detect attacks [6, 7]. In neighbors’ cooperative approaches,
neighbor nodes of the given node collect neighbors’ information and make a collective decision to detect attacks [8, 9].
Essentially, [10] is a neighbors’ approach because it collects
neighbors’ data, though it processes them with statistical
method. Similarly, [11] also belongs to neighbors’ approach,
though it makes decisions based on threshold analysis.
We note that all of the above schemes can be used to
detect attacks in some extent; however there might not be
high eﬃciency because researchers implicitly suppose that
any node, whether it is located near or far from the base
station, has the same probability of being attacked. This assumption is not always suitable; for example, in battlefield
surveillance applications, the attack event close to an enemycontrolled area occurs with a larger probability than in a controlled area. Thus, knowing the distribution of attacks can
help us to design eﬃcient and eﬀective secure mechanisms
to detect and defend against them. This point is our main
focus in this paper.
2.2.

Node positioning

In some location systems, several sensors have a position
system such as GPS to locate their positions. We call this
type of sensor beacon node. These location systems use location information from these beacon nodes to construct
the whole location system by utilizing ultrasound and timeof-flight techniques. Capkun and Hubaux [12] proposed a
mechanism for position verification, called verifiable multilateration (VM) based on distance bounding techniques
[13], which can prevent a compromised node from reducing the measured distance. VM uses the distance bound measurements from three or more reference points (verifiers) to
verify the position of the claimant. Lazos and Poovendran
[14] proposed a range overlapping method instead of using
expensive distance estimation methods. Its main idea is as
follows: each locator transmits diﬀerent beacons with individual coordinates and coverage sector areas. After receiving
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enough sector information from diﬀerent locators, the sensor estimates its location as the center of gravity of the overlapping region of the sectors that include it.
Due to adversaries’ attacks, the beacon nodes or normal
nodes maybe compromised. Some location systems estimate
location by combining deployment knowledge and probability theory without beacons. For example, Fang et al. [15] integrated predeployment knowledge of sensors and the maximum likelihood estimation method to estimate the sensors’
locations.

Base station

Sensor node

3.

MODELING OF ATTACK DISTRIBUTION

Before presenting the models of attack distribution, we describe some assumptions regarding the sensor network security scenarios.
3.1. Network and security assumptions
The followings are assumptions of WSNs.
(i) Base station: the base station is computationally robust, having the requisite processor speed, memory,
and power to support the cryptographic and routing
requirements of the sensor network. Adversaries can
destroy the base station but they cannot compromise
it within the limited time.
(ii) Sensor nodes: the sensor nodes are similar to current generation sensor nodes in their computational
and communication capabilities and their power resources [16]. They can be deployed via aerial scattering
or by physical installation. We assume that any sensor
node will know the position of itself and its immediate
neighbor nodes after deployment and the base station
will know all the nodes’ positions. All the sensor nodes
will not change their positions after deployed. If adversaries change the positions of nodes or identity, the
neighbor nodes will detect this attack [17], and this is
not the focus of this paper.
(iii) Adversary: adversaries have unlimited energy and
computing power. An attacker needs to spend some
time to attack a node. In the attacking process, they
will not change the targets until the chosen target
nodes were attacked. After attacking one node, the attacker will continue attacking a new good node without any halt, stop, or hibernation.
3.2. Distribution models
Based on whether, an attack event is thought of as independent event or not; we classify the attack distribution models
as either basic models or intelligent models. To focus on the
main viewpoint of attack distribution models, we only use
2-dimension distribution models, which assume that all the
nodes are in the same plane.

Adversary

Figure 1: Basic uniform attack model.

neighbors within these models. When the attack probability
and the frequency are comparatively small, the correlation of
attacking among neighbors can be neglected. Under this condition, basic models are accurate enough to estimate the attack probability. Due to diﬀerent application environments,
we classify the basic models as either uniform models or gradient models.
(1) Basic uniform attack distribution model
In some sensor network application situations, such as environmental and health applications, every sensor node has
nearly the same probability of being attacked despite of its
position. In such cases, the attack probabilities of nodes
following uniform distribution are reasonable, as shown in
Figure 1.
The mathematical model is given by
P(x,y,t) = ρ(t),

(1)

where (x, y) is the coordinate of the sensor; p(x,y,t) is the attack probability of this sensor at time t; ρ(t) is a distributed
function which is independent of the coordinates of a sensor. Most current security approaches use this simple model
without a clear declaration.
(2) Basic gradient attack distribution model
In some special application scenarios, such as battlefield
surveillance, reconnaissance of opposing forces and terrain,
and other military applications, the basic uniform attack
model is not suitable because the nodes close to an enemycontrolled area may have larger probabilities of being attacked than the nodes that are far away from an enemycontrolled area. Thus, a rough gradient-based attack model
approximates to the real environment. The gradient is based
on the distance from the opponent or the base station, as
shown Figure 2.
The mathematical model is given by




P(x,y,t) = ρ(0, 0, t) 1 + gd(x,y) ,
3.2.1. Basic attack distribution models
We label some models as basic attack models because the
probability of one sensor being attacked does not aﬀect its

(2)

where ρ(0, 0, t) is the attack probability in the base station
area at time t; g is the gradient function; d(x,y) is the projective vector of sensor (x, y) in the gradient direction. In
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Enemy side

(iii)
(iv)
Base
station

(v)

Sensor node
Adversary

Figure 2: Basic gradient attack model.

this model, the closer that a sensor node is to an enemycontrolled area, the more probable that it is attacked. The
diﬀerence between a uniform model and a gradient model is
that the location of a sensor may aﬀect the attack probability in
the latter model, while it does not matter in the previous model.
3.2.2. Intelligent attack distribution models
The above basic models assume that every attack is an independent event. This supposition is not accurate enough when
the probability and frequency of attacks are comparatively
larger, especially in a dense sensor network. In this environment, the attack probability will increase when its neighbors
have been recently attacked. It is easier and more conceivable
for adversaries to attack the nearest neighbors in the next period after they have attacked a sensor because of what follows.
(i) The communication information between the attacked node and its neighbors may help adversaries
to attack them easily, and the adversary is intelligent
enough to utilize this correlation.
(ii) A recently attacked node means that the adversary is
close to that node, and thus its neighbor nodes have
larger probabilities of being chosen as the target of this
adversary.
(iii) Attacking more nodes in a nearby area may badly impair the system when the sensor network uses a majority decision mechanism to integrate data, prevent
error, and so on.
The diﬀerence between a basic model and an intelligent
model is that the latter model considers the eﬀect of attack
events coming from neighbor nodes when estimating the attack
probability. In intelligent models, systems should have mechanisms to detect and record the attack events and use current
attack events to estimate future attacks. That’s why we call
these models intelligent models. Before describing intelligent
models, we give some technical terms as follows.
(i) Attacked node: it is a node that has already been attacked by an attacker and the attacker got its assaulting result, such as compromising the node, disabling
it, and so on.
(ii) Attacking time: the time spent by an attacker to attack
a benign node to get assaulting result. In our models,

(vi)

attacking time follows normal distribution and the expected value is τ.
Detected attacked node: it is an attacked node and the
attack event has already been detected by the system.
Recently attacked node: it is an attacked node that has
been attacked within time interval τ.
Detecting attacked time: the time interval between the
time when the node was attacked and the time when
the system detected that the node was attacked. In our
models, it also follows normal distribution.
i-hop neighbor: an i-hop neighbor is a node that at
least needs number of i-hops to reach the given node.

In this type of model, we assume that the expected time
for an adversary attack against a good node is τ and adversaries will continue attacking the good nodes with this frequency without any halt, stop, changing attacking target, or
hibernation. In some sensor security mechanisms, the expected value τ maybe decreases when more and more nodes
are attacked. But the attack diﬃculty can be retained as the
previous and the assumption of the average attack time is
still suitable if the application meets one or two cases: the
total number of the attacked nodes is comparatively small
compared with the large number of the normal nodes; the
system assumes some adapting methods to enhance the security. A normal distribution with expected value τ can approximate the attack probability. Under this assumption, we
time the system with each interval of τ. Our object is to use
current available attack event information to estimate the attack probability in the next time period. We imagine that the
probability of a node being attacked includes two parts: current adversaries and new adversaries, which will be joined
in the next period. Thus, we get the following mathematical
model:
P(x,y,t) = S(x,y,t) + C(x,y,t)
(nτ < t < (n + 1)τ, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .),

(3)

where S(x,y,t) is the attack probability, which is introduced by
newly added adversaries in the time period from nτ to (n +
1)τ; C(x,y,t) is the probability that is introduced by current
adversaries.
Similar to basic model classifications, an intelligent
model can also be classified as a uniform model and a gradient model.
(1) Intelligent uniform attack distribution model
This model adapts the application environment where the
new adversaries evenly distribute within the coverage area.
In this model, (3) can be expressed as follows:
P(x,y,t) = S(t) + C(x,y,t)
(nτ < t < (n + 1)τ, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .),

(4)

where S(t) follows uniform distribution and does not care
about node positioning, and this part is introduced by newly
added adversaries from time nτ.
We assume 1-hop neighbors of the given node are the
nodes which are the immediate neighbor nodes of the given
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e
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2e
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2k

all Mi nodes; ni j is the total number of i-hop neighbors to
node (xi j , yi j ) and ki j of them are attacked nodes; the probability of one of i-hop nodes to be chosen as the attacking target of the adversary, which corresponds to a recently attacked
node, is pi . Qi j (t) is the attack probability of the chosen attacking target in time t. Qi j (t) follows normal distribution
and the expected value is τ. pi follows geometric distribution
and is given by

2g

2d

b
2c

2l

pi = ar d(i−1)

2b

a

(i = 1, 2, . . . , 0 < a < 1, 0 < r < 1),

Recently attacked node

N


1-hop node

i=1

Figure 3: Difinitions in intelligent mode.

node and can directly connect to this node; 2-hop neighbors
of the given node are the nodes which can contact the given
node at least by two hops, and so on. We call all the 1-hop
neighbors of the given node as 1-hop layer nodes, and all the
2-hop neighbors as 2-hop layer, and so on. In dense WSNs,
the distances between a given node and its 1-hop neighbors
are nearly equal. Therefore, we suppose that each 1-hop benign neighbor of a recently attacked node has the same probability of being chosen as the attacking target of an adversary
which corresponds to this recently attacked node. Similarly,
we make the same assumption of 2-hop neighbors, 3-hop
neighbors, and so on. While the probability that one of 1hop layer nodes being chosen as the attacking target is larger
than the probability of 2-hop layer node, and so on, a geometric distribution can approximate the probability of the
adversary, which corresponds to the recently attacked node,
choosing an attacking target from diﬀerent layers.
Figure 3 clearly shows the above definitions. As shown in
Figure 3, node a is the given node; nodes b, c, d, e, f , and g
are 1-hop neighbor nodes of node a; nodes 2b − 2l are 2-hop
neighbors of node a. Nodes b and g have the same probability of being chosen as the attacking target in the next time
period. Similarly, nodes 2b and 2l have the same probability of being chosen as the attacking target in the next time
period. While the probability that one of 1-hop layer nodes
(b and g) being chosen as the attacking target is larger than
that of one of 2-hop layer nodes (2b and 2l), and so on, a
geometric distribution can approximate this assumption.
As shown in Appendix A, C(x,y,t) is given by
Mi 
N 


1−

i=1 j =1

1
ni j − ki j

(7)

where a, r, and d are parameters of geometric distribution; a
is the total probability of an adversary choosing a good node,
1-hop to the recently attacked node, as the attacking target; r
is the ratio which is less than 1, and d is a natural number.
As shown in Appendix A, we get the following equation:

2-hop node

C(x,y,t) = 1 −

pi = 1,

(6)



pi Qi j (t)

(5)

(nτ < t < (n + 1)τ, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .),
where N is the largest number of hops that node (x, y) can
access all the nodes in the network; Mi is the number of nodes
that have been recently attacked and are i-hops to node (x, y);
node (xi j , yi j ) is denoted as the jth recently attacked node in

a = 1 − rd.

(8)

In the case of ni j = ki j in (5), we use 1 instead of the
product item 1 − 1/(ni j − ki j )pi Qi j (t) first, and then replace
pb+1 with pb (b > i) for each product item with index j. For
example, if n1 j = k1 j , we use 1 instead of the product 1 −
1/(n1 j − k1 j )p1 Q1 j (t), and replace p2 with p1 , p3 with p2 ,
and so on for each product item with index j.
In normal distribution, about 99.7% of values lie within 3
standard deviations. The beginning attacking time (denoted
by ts ) is the time when node (xi j , yi j ) is actually attacked. In
time ts , Qi j (t) is equal to 0. In a practical environment, we
cannot know the actual attacking time S(t) , but we can approximate it by subtracting the average detecting time from
the actual detecting time of node (xi j , yi j ) being attacked.
Suppose the number of new added adversaries follows
uniform distribution of time. As shown in Appendix B, St is
given by
S(t) = 1 −

m
−1

i=0

λΔt
1−
Q(nτ + iΔt)
Ng



(9)

(nτ < t < (n + 1)τ, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .),
where Δt is a very small time period which can be thought
of as the smallest time unit in the system; t = nτ + mΔt
(m = 1, 2, 3, . . .); λ is the number of new adversaries that are
introduced in a unit time; Ng is the number of current good
nodes in the network; Similar to Qü (t), Q(nτ + iΔt), follows
the same normal distribution and nτ + iΔt is the time when
newly introduced attacker nodes begin to attack probability
in a unit time for each node (i.e., a node has δ probability of
being chosen as the attacking target by the new adversaries in
a unit time), which is given by
δ=

λ
.
Ng

(10)

To describe clearly the intelligent uniform model, we use
Figure 4 to calculate the attack probability of node a.
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where S(x,y,t) is given by

2h
2i

2g



2j

f

d
c

g

2c

2l

(13)

Equation (13) is similar to (2). The only diﬀerence between these two equations is that the intelligent models partition the system time in small time period, which equals the
average attacking time τ. The only diﬀerence between an intelligent uniform model and an intelligent gradient model
is that they have diﬀerent first items in the mathematical
model expression. The first item of the latter follows a gradient distribution of position, while the previous follows a uniform distribution. Similar to an intelligent uniform model,
ρ(0, 0, t) can be estimated as the following equation:

2d

b



(nτ < t < (n + 1)τ, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .).

2e

a
2k

S(x,y,t) = ρ(0, 0, t) 1 + gd(x,y)

2f

e

2b

Normal node
Old attacked node
Recently attacked node

ρ(0, 0, t) = 1 −

Figure 4: Intelligent uniform attack mode.

m
−1






1 − δ0 ΔtQ t0 + iΔt



i=0

(14)

(nτ < t < (n + 1)τ, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .),
In Figure 4, nodes b and g are 1-hop neighbors of node
a; nodes 2b and 2l are 2-hop neighbors of node a; nodes
a, c, 2c, 2b, 2l, and g are 1-hop neighbors of node b; nodes
b and 2c are recently attacked nodes that have been attacked
in the last time period; nodes d and c are old attacked nodes.
In Figure 4 for node a, N = 2, that is, node a can reach all
the sensors in the network within 2 hops. Node a has one 1hop neighbor node (node b) and one 2-hop neighbor node
(node 2c) that have been recently attacked. So M1 = 1 and
M2 = 1. Node b has six 1-hop neighbors, thus n11 = 6.
Node b has two 1-hop attacked neighbors, that is, node c
and node 2c, then k11 = 2. Node 2c has five 2-hop neighbors (node 2l, g, a, d, and 2e) and one 2-hop attacked neighbor (node d), consequently n21 = 5, k21 = 1. Suppose
p1 = 0.8, p2 = 0.16, Qb (t) = 0.6, Q2c (t) = 0.4, and no new
adversaries are introduced in the network. We calculate the
attack probability of node a as follows:

where δ0 is the attack probability in a unit time in the base
station area (i.e., a node has δ0 probability of being chosen
as the attacking target in a unit time in this small area); the
other parameters in (14) are the same as parameters in (9).
Someone may say that the second part of (12) should
also adjust with gradient weight. Firstly, for a given recently
attacked node, the probability of a corresponding adversary choosing an 1-hop layer node as the attacking target is
larger than the probability to choose a 2-hop layer node (i.e.,
p1 > p2 > p3 . . .). Secondly, the diﬀerence of gradient weight
among 1-hop neighbors is comparatively small especially in
dense networks. Thirdly, for an attacker, the diﬀerence of attacking probabilities in diﬀerent directions is close to zero.
The number of attackers in diﬀerent directions can embody
the gradient model enough. Thus, for easy estimation, we
only introduce the gradient vector in the first part of (12).
Figure 5 shows this model.
4.







1
× 0.8 × 0.6
6−2


1
× 1−
× 0.16 × 0.4
5−1
= 0.13408.

P(x,y,t) = 0 + 1 − 1 −

(11)

(2) Intelligent gradient attack distribution model
This model adapts the application environment where the
new introduced attackers follow a gradient distribution of
positions. Similar to the above intelligent uniform model, the
mathematical model of attack probability is given by

P(x,y,t) = S(x,y,t) + 1 −

Mi 
N 


1−

i=1 j =1

1
ni j − ki j



pi Qi j (t)

(nτ < t < (n + 1)τ, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .),

(12)

APPLICATIONS OF ATTACK DISTRIBUTION MODELS

Defending against attacks is the key successful factor for sensor network security. Attack distribution model can help systems defend against attacks before they occur or if they have
already occurred but have not been detected. Our models can
be applied to many types of attacks. For example, basic models can be adapted to most types of attacks that are introduced in Section 2. And they provide a rough attack probability estimation that can be used to analyze system security
weakness and help to defend against them with more eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness. While our intelligent models can be
applied to detect and defend against those types of attacks
that have neighbor correlation eﬀects with giving more accurate attack probability estimation , a neighbor correlation
eﬀect is a phenomenon that a node has larger probability of
being attacked in the near future when its neighbor has been
recently attacked. Of course, to use intelligent models, systems have many attack detecting mechanisms.
We can apply attack distribution models to analyze
system security weakness, improve security performance,
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Figure 5: Intelligent gradient attack model.

distribute system resources eﬃciently on security cost, and
so on. Because this is the first introduction of the attack distribution model, more research works should be performed
in the future. In the following, we will give some application
examples of how to use our models to provide eﬃcient and
eﬀective security mechanisms.
4.1. Detecting attack
Detecting attack is an important task for system security. In
this area, the modeling of attack will help a lot. A standard
application of intelligent models is to integrate them into
current attack detecting system. For example, most current
monitoring systems, such as in [6–11], monitor all the nodes
in the system without emphasis, and the system should decentralize their resources evenly in all nodes in order to monitor whether they have larger attack probabilities or not. That
makes the detecting mechanism less eﬃcient. Due to the
heavy work, the system performance may decrease largely,
and may even make this work unpractical. Applying our
models to these monitoring systems and choosing nodes that
have larger attack probabilities as the main monitoring objects will make node monitoring work more eﬀectively and
more eﬃciently; thus allowing the system to have enough resources to defend against attacks.
4.2. Secure routing
WSNs use multihop routing and wireless communication to
transfer data, thus incur more routing attacks. To our knowledge, there is no previously published work to provide an
eﬀective routing algorithm that can prevent routing paths
from passing those nodes that have been attacked but have
not been detected by the system. Based on our survey, until
now few proposals even consider undetected attack issues.
An ideal secure routing algorithm to defend against attacks lets routing paths bypass all attacked nodes. However,
most attack activities can not be immediately detected because any detection mechanism needs time and the fraudu-

lent action of adversaries (Adversaries do not want system to
notice their attacking activities, thus they will adopt any action that one can imagine to make the detecting time longer.)
makes the time even longer. A routing path is still a compromise path when it passes those “good” nodes which system considers as good nodes while they are actually attacked
nodes that just have not been detected yet. Applying our
attack distribution models in secure routing algorithm design can ease this issue. We develop a novel probability secure routing scheme that estimates the attack probability and
makes the routing paths detour those nodes that have already
been detected as attacked nodes or have larger attack probabilities than the given threshold.
Figures 6, 7, and8 are the results from the same simulation. These three figures are used to compare diﬀerent routing algorithms. To describe easily, we define the routing algorithm without security consideration as ALG-I (e.g., AODV
in [18]), the algorithm that the routing path bypasses those
detected attacked nodes as ALG-II (e.g., pathrater in [8]),
our algorithm as ALG-III (threshold is 0.12). The threshold
choosing corresponds to the security requirement. We will
discuss it later. In this simulation, the attack distribution
follows an intelligent uniform model; there are 400 sensor
nodes in the network and node density is equal to 10. The
expected time for an adversary to attack a benign node is τ,
which is equal to 300 unit time; the average time for system
to detect an attacked node is also equal to τ. In each unit
time, there are 10 randomly chosen routing requests to the
base station; the simulation time is 20τ; the intelligent model
parameters values are as follows: a = 0.8, r = 0.2, and d = 1.
At the beginning time of this simulation, there are 10 adversaries introduced to attack this sensor network, and there are
no more newly adversaries to be introduced in this system.
The probability threshold to distinguish good or bad nodes
is 0.12.
In Figure 6, average compromise path ratio is the ratio of
the number of compromise paths to the number of routing
requests in the whole simulation time. If the value of average
compromise path ratio is larger, it means less routing security under attack. This figure clearly shows what follows: the
average compromise path ratio in ALG-I is the largest among
three algorithms; the average compromise path ratio in ALGII is in the middle; ALG-III has the least average compromise
path ratio as expected, and has the best security performance.
That’s easy to understand. ALG-I has the largest probability of finding a routing path to pass attacked nodes because
the routing algorithm does not consider detouring attacked
nodes. The attack probability will be rapidly decreased when
the system adopts attack detecting mechanisms and makes
the routing paths bypass those attacked nodes that have been
detected by the system. Besides bypassing those detected attacked nodes in the routing path, our algorithm also lets the
routing path bypass those nodes that have larger probabilities
of being attacked, and then the routing path will bypass some
nodes that have already been attacked but have not been detected by the system. As a result, our algorithm improves the
routing security further.
Figure 7 compares the average routing path length (it
is the average number of links for each routing path.) in
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diﬀerent algorithms. It shows what follows: the average path
length in ALG-I is the smallest; the average path length in
ALG-II is in the middle; ALG-III has the largest average path
length. The reason is that ALG-I finds the routing paths that
have the least hops, thus it has the smallest average path
length; while ALG-II may find paths that satisfies the security requirement but may not be the least hop paths. In our
algorithm, besides bypassing those detected attacked nodes
in the path, the routing path should also detour some estimate bad nodes, making the average path length the largest
among the three types of algorithms.
Figure 8 compares the average successful ratio (This is the
ratio of the number of successful routing requests to the total number of routing requests.) in diﬀerent algorithms. It
shows what follows: the average successful ratio is 100 percent in ALG-I; the average successful ratio in ALG-II is in the
middle; the average successful ratio in ALG-III is the least.
Radically, in a completely connected network, every routing request will find a successful path. While some routing
requests cannot find successful routing paths in ALG-II because there exist some probabilities for some nodes who are
surrounded by detected attacked nodes and cannot find valid
routing paths; the successful ratio will decrease further when
the system considers some probability attack nodes as bad
nodes in our algorithm.
Figures 9, 10, and11 compare the security, overhead, and
successful ratio results with diﬀerent thresholds in our algo-

rithm. We use the same parameters as the simulation for Figures 6, 7, and 8, except diﬀerent thresholds.
The main object of Figures 9 and 11 is to compare security, overhead and successful routing eﬀects under diﬀerent thresholds. When the threshold increases, the security
performance decreases (average compromise path ratio increases as shown in Figure 9), the average length of routing
paths decreases (average path length decreases as shown in
Figure 10), and successful ratio increases (average successful
ratio increases as shown in Figure 11). The reason is that after the threshold increase, the system considers more nodes
as good nodes and it makes the secure network connectivity
increase. Thus, the system has a larger probability to find a
successful routing path for a routing request, and the average
length for routing paths decreases because the total number
of bad nodes in the algorithm is getting smaller. At the same
time, the security performance decreases because a routing
path has a larger probability to pass a node that has actually
been attacked but has not been detected, and is thought of
as a good node in the system. These three figures also show
that the curves change sharply initially and tend to flat later.
The reason is that we suppose that attacking time follows a
normal distribution, and the attacking time for most attack
events will fall into the nearby area of the expected value of
the normal distribution (normal distribution has a convergence property). If the threshold is close to the center value
of the above converging area, then the number of undetected
attacked nodes to be filtered by our algorithm will vary to a
large extent, making the curves tilt sharply. While the threshold is far from the center value of the above converging area,
the number of undetected attacked nodes to be filtered by
our algorithm will alter less, making the slope of the curves a
near constant.
Besides improving routing security, using our models can
also help systems save eﬀective energy. As we know, systems
cannot use attacked nodes in some applications, though they
may have larger energy. If we know a node has a larger probability of being attacked in the future, utilizing its resources
and energy before it has been attacked will help systems decrease the energy and resource loss. Attack distribution models can estimate attack probabilities in the future. If we apply
attack distribution models and design a routing algorithm
which allows routing paths to choose those nodes whose attack probabilities are still in the secure scope but may enter
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into an insecure scope in the future, it will save systems eﬀective energy and resources while still providing enough security.
4.3. Key management
For security, key management is very important and complex, especially in symmetric cryptography structures. Many
current key management proposals, such as [19–21], do not
consider the attack distribution. They imply the attack probability to be the same for every node. However, when their
security system is deployed in a diﬀerent environment from
their supposition, the security performance will decrease
greatly.
For example, in [19], the security scheme requires q common keys (q is a constant, q ≥ 1) to establish secure communications between a pair of nodes. In their scheme, q is equal
in each area. When their scheme is deployed in a gradientbased environment, the security performance will decrease
because the system has the same ability to tolerate or defend against attacks in all areas, but adversaries attack the
system with diﬀerent strengths on diﬀerent areas; thus making the system unable to provide enough security in some
areas and able to provide more security than needed in other
areas. Of course, you can increase q to provide enough security everywhere, but it will consume more resources. It looks
diﬃcult to get a high security performance with a low overhead; however, when you apply an attack distribution model

to this security mechanism, you will find that this is the key
in solving this issue. For example, if we apply q to follow the
same distribution as the attack distribution model, that is,
q ⇒ q(x, y), where (x, y) is the coordinates of node, the system will solve the above-mentioned issue. In the modified security scheme, the ratio between the strength of preventions
and attacks can be kept the same in every area. In [20, 21],
though this scheme has a nice threshold property λ (when the
number of compromised nodes is less than the threshold λ,
the probability that any nodes other than these compromised
nodes are aﬀected is close to zero), it needs more resources
to implement this desirable threshold when it is deployed
in a gradient-based application environment. Similarly, we
can also apply λ to follow the same distribution as the attack
model of the given application environment to ease the issue.
Besides improving the key predistribution step of key
management, we can also apply our models to aberrant node
management, rekeying frequency, and so on. with the similar modification method in order to improve system performance and security.
5.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper, we have developed several models to estimate
attack distribution in diﬀerent sensor network application
environments. These models allow systems to estimate the
probabilities of attacks. Applying these models to system security design will improve system security performance and
decrease the overheads in nearly every security related area.
Based on these models, we briefly describe a novel secure
routing algorithm that can defend against undetected attacks
eﬀectively. Besides this application, we also introduce some
other applications, such as secure routing that both saves
systems available energy and resources while still providing
enough security, detecting attack, and key management.
Because this is the first time we try to model the distribution of attacks, there are some important works that we
plan to study in the future. For example, how to model the
attack distribution in mobile networks? How to find the suitable values for the parameters in current models when they
are deployed in practical applications?
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APPENDICES
A.

APPENDIX A

In the intelligent uniform model, the probability of a node
being attacked which is introduced by all recently attacked
nodes is given by
C(x,y,t) = 1 −

where Qi j (t) is the attack probability of the chosen attacking target in time t. Qi j (t) follows normal distribution and
the expected value is τ. Thus, the unattacked probability
(denoted by h) of node (x, y), which corresponds to node
(xi j , yi j ), is given by
h=1−

Mi
N 


1−

i=1 j =1

1
ni j − ki j

pi Qi j (t)

(A.1)

(nτ < t < (n + 1)τ, n = 0, 1, 2, ..., ).

pi = ar d(i−1)

(i = 1, 2, ..., 0 < a < 1, 0 < r < 1),
N


pi = 1,

(A.2)

l=

s=

i=1

(A.4)

If N is a large natural number, (A.4) can be expressed as the
following equation:
N


pi ≈

i=1

a
1−r

.
d

1−

1
pi Qi j (t),
ni j − ki j

(A.10)



1
ni j − ki j

Mi 
N 


1−

i=1 j =1

pi Qi j (t) .

(A.11)

1
ni j − ki j



pi Qi j (t)

(A.12)

(nτ < t < (n + 1)τ, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .).
B.

APPENDIX B

In intelligent uniform model, the probability of one node
being attacked, which is introduced by all new adversaries
joined from time nτ, is given by
S(t) = 1 −

m
−1


1−

i=0

(A.6)

(A.7)

The probability (denoted by f ) of node (x, y) of being attacked at time t, which corresponds to node (xi j , yi j ), is given
by
f =

pi Qi j (t) .

λΔt
Q(nτ + iΔt)
Ng



(B.13)

(nτ < t < (n + 1)τ, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .).

From the above suppositions, the probability (denoted by e)
of node (x, y) to be chosen as the attacking target of the adversary which corresponds to node (xi j , yi j ) is given by
1
pi .
ni j − ki j

ni j − ki j

Mi 
N 


C(x,y,t) = 1 −

(A.5)

Derivation of C(x,y,t)

e=

1−

Finally, the probability of node (x, y) being attacked, which
corresponds to all recently attacked nodes, is given by

From (A.3) and (A.5), we get the following equation:
a = 1 − rd.

(A.9)



1

i=1 j =1

where a, r, and d are parameters of geometric distribution, d
is a natural number.
From (A.3), we have following equation:
a − ar dN
.
1 − rd

pi Qi j (t).

Then, the unattacked probability (denoted by s) of node
(x, y), which corresponds to all recently attacked nodes, is
given by

(A.3)

pi = a + ar d + ar 2d + ar 3d + · · · =

Mi 

j =1

i=1

N


ni j − ki j

Then, the unattacked probability (denoted by l) of node
(x, y), which corresponds to all recently i-hop attacked
nodes, is given by

Suppose
Benign node (x, y) can access all the nodes in the network at
most by N hops; node (x, y) has Mi recently attacked nodes
which are i-hops to it. We denote node (xi j , yi j ) as the jth
recently attacked node in all Mi nodes; node (xi j , yi j ) has ni j
i-hop neighbors and ki j of them are attacked nodes; the probability of one of i-hop nodes of being chosen as the attacking
target of the adversary, which corresponds to a recently attacked node, is pi . pi follows geometric distribution and is
given by

1

(A.8)

Suppose
The number of newly added adversaries follows uniform distribution of time and the time for an adversary to attack a
node follows normal distribution which is expressed as Q
function. Δt is a very small time period which can be thought
of as the smallest time unit in the system; t = nτ + mΔt
(m = 1, 2, 3, . . .); λ is the number of new adversaries that are
introduced in a unit time; Ng is the number of current good
nodes in the network; Q(nτ + (i − 1)Δt) is a normal distribution function; δ is the attack probability in unit time for
each node (i.e., a node has δ probability to be chosen as the
attacking target in a unit time), which is given by
δ=

λ
.
Ng

(B.14)
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Derivation
In each Δt time period, there are λΔt adversaries added to the
network. Considering the ith time period which begins from
nτ + (i − 1)Δt to nτ + iΔt, we have what follows.
The probability (denoted by Ps,Δt ) of one node being chosen as the attacking target by the new λΔt adversaries that are
introduced in the ith time period is given by
Ps,Δt =

λΔt
.
Ng

(B.15)

Then, the probability (denoted by Pc,Δt ) of one node being
attacked by the new λΔt adversaries that are introduced in
the ith time period, is given by

λΔt 
Q nτ + (i − 1)Δt .
Ng

Pc,Δt =

(B.16)

Then, the probability (denoted by Pnc,Δt ) of a node that has
not been attacked by the new λΔt adversaries that are introduced in the ith time period is given by
Pnc,Δt = 1 −


λΔt 
Q nτ + (i − 1)Δt .
Ng

(B.17)

Thus, the probability (denoted by Pnc,Δt ) of a node that has
not been attacked by all the new adversaries that are introduced from nτ to now is given by
Pnc,t =

m 


1−

i=1


λΔt 
Q nτ + (i − 1)Δt .
Ng

(B.18)

Finally, the probability of one node to be attacked, which is
introduced by all new adversaries that are introduced from
time nτ, is given by
S(t) = 1 −

m
−1


1−

i=0



λΔt
Q(nτ + iΔt) .
Ng

(B.19)
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